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IV. STATEMENTS OF FACTS. 
The Plaintiff, Cornish Town, incorporates herein by reference the 
Statement of Facts set forth in its Cross-Appellant's Brief previously 
filed herein, and adds the following facts in response to the 
Defendants1 Statement of Facts in their Reply Brief. 
It is critical to the Courtfs decision on this appeal that four 
distinctions, which tend to be blurred somewhat by the Statement of 
Facts and Argument in Defendants1 Reply Brief, be kept perfectly clear. 
The first distinction is that between the Pearson Spring (owned by 
Cornish) , which is located in a small wash or gully and which is west 
of and at a higher elevation than the area generally referred to as 
Butler Hollow, and the Butler Hollow Springs (owned by Rollers) which 
are located (or were at one time located, since they now are virtually 
non-existent) within that ravine or small canyon known as Butler 
Hollow, which is east of and at a lower elevation than the Pearson 
Spring area. All water taken by the Town of Cornish from the Pearson 
Spring is collected in a catch basin near the east end of the 
afore-referenced gully, then diverted out of the catch basin into the 
Town's six-inch pipe which takes the water to its reservoirs, all of 
which occurs above the Butler Hollow and totally apart from any waters 
which may originate below from the Butler Hollow Springs (See Exhibits 
1, 2, 4, 34, 41 and 42-51; and E. K. Tr. 38, 41-2, 44, 47-8, 51, and A. 
B. Tr. 44, 71-3). 
The second distinction critical to an understanding of this appeal 
is that distinction between the two sources of water received by the 
Defendants and their predecessors: namely, Pearson Spring water which 
-4-
they receive through their 3/4-inch tap right reserved under the 1938 
Deed (Exhibit 8) , which was delivered to them through a smaller pipe 
(in a field south of Butler Hollow) and which is hooked up to the 
Town's four-inch mainline from the Pearson Spring and comes down the 
hill from the West to their home, and that water which sporadically 
runs down Butler Hollow (whether from rain water, the Butler Hollow 
Springs or from surface water run-off from the Pearson Spring area 
above, and ends up in a fish pond/dam which the Rollers built in 1962 
at the bottom of Butler Hollow near their house (See Exhibits 1-2, 4, 
34, 36, 38, and 47-51; and E. K. Tr. 40-2, 44, 51, 66-7, 98, 116-17, 
122, 143, 154; and A. B. Tr . 44, 59-60, 63, 71, 75; and V. B. Tr. 8-9, 
16) . 
The third key distinction is that between the spring water which 
the Town of Cornish collects in the gully where the Pearson Spring and 
the catch basin are located and the surface run-off water which runs 
along the surface of the gully past the Pearson Spring catch basin down 
into the Butler Hollow below, which run-off water may originate from 
rain or from excess surface percolation of the Pearson Springs which is 
not efficiently collected by the Town, but which they hope to collect 
more efficiently in the future by redeveloping their catch line and 
catch basin system in that area (See E. K. Tr. 42, 44, 51, 54, 57). 
The fourth distinction is that of Pearson Spring water flow and 
usage before 1962, when Rollers built their fish pond/dam at the bottom 
of Butler Hollow and when an earthquake occurred, versus its flow and 
usage after 1962 (E. K. Tr. 39-44, 47-48, 51, 57, 97; A. B. Tr. 44, 71, 
73; V. B. Tr. 6). 
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Cornish does not contest, nor did the witnesses Asael Buttars and 
Verl Buxton, that the Rollers and their predecessors used the water 
from the Pearson Spring which was piped to them from the Town's 
mainline via their 3/4-inch tap right; nor does Cornish contest the 
allegation that the Rollers and their predecessors have used some water 
sporadically running out of Butler Hollow from rainfall or the Butler 
Hollow Springs before 1962. But there was no evidence presented at 
trial that the Pearsons, Marie Dobbs or Rollers ever received water 
running out of Butler Hollow which originated from the Pearson Spring 
(as opposed to mere rainwater) after the Town in 1939 constructed its 
water- works system and directed all the water into its system and 
before 1962 when Rollers built their dam (shortly after the time of the 
earthquake) . Even after 1962, it would appear that Defendants1 Facts 
acknowledge that all they have ever really received from the Pearson 
Spring is the intermittent, highly variable overflow in wet years. Mr. 
and Mrs. Roller furnished no dates in the course of their testimony 
with respect to their personal knowledge of any alleged use by the 
Pearsons or Marie Dobbs on the Pearson property prior to 1962 of 
Pearson Spring water coming out of the Hollow. To the contrary, Mr. 
Roller testified that the Pearson Spring area was generally dry prior 
to a 1962 earthquake (E. R. Tr. 39, 42, 44). 
Cornish also takes exception to the Rollers' Statement of Facts 
concerning the extent of Asael Buttar's and Verl Buxton's familiarity 
with and number of visits to the Pearson Spring area, Butler Hollow, 
the old Lars Pearson property and the municipal waterworks generally. 
Asael Buttars testified that he was necessarily on the property several 
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times a year in the course of his official duties for the Town from 
1952 through 1958 (a six-year period by itself), as well as his prior 
general travels, involvement with his father's mayoral duties and his 
personal acquaintance with the Pearsons who were his neighbors in the 
Cornish area from 1941 to 1958 (A. B. Tr. 42-54, 70). Verl Buxton 
testified that he travelled the north road to Pearson Spring 
continually and testified that he travelled up Butler Hollow to the 
Pearson Spring area at least four times a year throughout the period he 
was mayor (1958 to 1970) (V. B. Tr. 1, 6) . Moreover, even if 
representatives from the Town had travelled the area only once every 
year, that would still be sufficient basis for a finding, based upon 
their observations, and absent any contrary evidence by Rollers, that 
Pearson Spring water was never put to any beneficial use on the 
Pearson/Dobbsf property before 1962 (beyond the 3/4-inch tap to the old 
Lars Pearson home) (A. B. Tr. 44, 60, 63, 73; V. B. Tr. 6, 8-9, 16). 
Asael Buttars stated that the 3/4-inch tap right used by the 
Pearson family or Marie Dobbs was the only water from the Pearson 
Spring ever applied to the Lars Pearson property itself, and that the 
family had only one tap and that it was the 3/4-inch tap to the Lars 
Pearson home called for in the 1938 Deed (A. B. Tr. 61, 63). Asael 
Buttars also testified that the Town took all the water that was 
available above the Pearson Spring catch basin, and did not attempt to 
collect water below the catch basin from the Butler Hollow springs (A. 
B. Tr. 71, 73). Verl Buxton testified that when he was Mayor of 
Cornish (from 1958 until 1970) the Butler Hollow was always dry, except 
for some spots where one would find cattails (V. B. Tr. 6). He further 
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testified that there was only one line to the old Lars Pearson home, 
which was the 3/4-inch tap line (V. B. Tr. 8-9, 16). 
At several points in Defendants1 Statement of Facts it is 
suggested or implied that Pearson Spring water which flowed down the 
Butler Hollow was beneficially used by the Marie Dobbs and her 
successors prior to 1962, but it should be noted that at page 7 of 
Cross-Respondents1 Statement of Facts, as elsewhere, no transcript 
references are given for this broad assertion. It was uncontested at 
trial that the only water received by the Rollers and their 
predecessors out of Butler Hollow prior to 1962 was sporadic rain 
run-off and a limited amount of water from the old Butler Hollow 
springs. There was no testimony of any deliberate attempt to actually 
divert water from the Pearson Spring area or the Pearson Spring catch 
basin by Pearsons, Marie Dobbs or her successors. The Town of Cornish 
had always had the use of all the water which it could collect from the 
Pearson Spring area without protest since 1939 (A. B. Tr. 60, 73; and 
E. K. Tr. 41, 44, 47-48). 
At page 7 of Defendants1 Statement of Facts, they acknowledge that 
there was no diversion of the water by Rollers or their predecessors 
from the Pearson Spring channel until the dam was built in 1962. In 
fact, before 1962 the water never effectively reached the old Pearson 
home site because it sank into a gravelly area at the mouth of the 
hollow and was lost (E. K. Tr. 42). Moreover, Marie Dobbs never lived 
on the subject property and Rollers first lived there in 1975 (E.R. Tr. 
52, 54, 75). 
The appropriated right which Cornish secured in 1939 (Exhibit 13) 
was for more than just the winter rights in the Pearson Spring. It 
also included an additional appropriation (above and beyond the parties 
-8-
prior rights) during the summer/irrigation season as well, inasmuch as 
the language of the certificate (Exhibit 13) states that this was a 
year-round usage (See also D. H. Tr• 9, 14-15). 
Defendants contend in their Statement of Facts that the correct 
definition of the "3/4-inch tap11, the right which their predecessors 
reserved in the 1939 Deed (Exhibit 8) refers to a tap at their house; 
whereas Plaintiff contends that the correct definition or location of 
that tap is at the point where the Rollers1 line "taps into" the Town's 
(four-inch) mainline from Pearson Spring above their house to the 
west (A. B. Tr. 59) . 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
FIRST ISSUE: 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS A ONE-FIFTH 
(1/5) INTEREST IN THE PEARSON SPRING BY MISCONSTRUING FACTS 
AND/OR THE LAW? 
POINT I. Whatever rights Marie Pearson Dobbs may have had to one-fifth 
(1/5) of the Pearson Spring water in 1938 have long since been 
forfeited to the public domain by the absence of any beneficial use of 
said one-fifth (1/5) interest by Marie Pearson Dobbs and her successors 
for a period far in excess of the minimum 5 year non-use requirement 
under Section 73-1-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
POINT II. The absence of any beneficial use of Pearson Spring water 
(except the 3/4-inch tap right) on the Pearson property by Mrs. Dobbs 
and her family before 1960 means, as a matter of law, that any alleged 
one-fifth (1/5) interest in the Pearson Spring was no longer 
appurtenant to said property, thereby precluding any transfer of the 
alleged one-fifth (1/5) interest by Mrs. Dobbs1 1960 Deed to the 
Defendants. 
POINT III* The Defendants are equitably estopped from claiming the 
alleged one-fifth (1/5) interest of Marie Pearson Dobbs by virtue of 
their and their predecessors acquiescence for more than 40 years to 
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Cornish Town's use of all of the Pearson Spring water and the Town's 
construction and ongoing maintenance, repair and development of its 
municipal waterworks for that period of time* 
SECOND ISSUE: 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO FURTHER CLARIFY THE 
RESPECTIVE SEASONAL WATER RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES PURSUANT 
TO THE UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY OF THE STATE ENGINEER? 
POINT I. The State Engineer, Dee Hansen, testified that the Pearson 
Spring waters should be formally divided between Cornish and the 
Rollers not only as to their respective shares of the original flow, 
but also as to irrigation and non-irrigation season rights, and as to 
the date their respective rights were established, and as to a 
secondary right appropriated by the Town in 1939* The Court could and 
should have adopted his testimony and clarified the parties' respective 
rights in the Pearson Spring. There was no justification for not 
making such clarification as requested at that time and subsequently by 
the Town in the absence of any contradictory evidence. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
FIRST ISSUE: 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS A ONE- FIFTH 
(1/5) INTEREST IN THE PEARSON SPRING BY MISCONSTRUING THE FACTS 
AND/OR THE LAW? 
POINT I. Whatever rights Marie Pearson Dobbs may have had to one-fifth 
(1/5) of the Pearson Spring water in 1938 have long since been 
forfeited to the public domain by the absence of any beneficial use of 
said one-fifth (1/5) interest by Marie Pearson Dobbs and her successors 
for a period far in excess of the minimum 5 year non-use requirement 
under Section 73-1-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
Cornish contends that there was insufficient evidence produced at 
trial by Rollers to justify the Court's entry of Findings 13, 14 and 
15, which led to paragraph 3 in the Court's Order of Judgment, 
declaring that Cross-Appellants are the owners of a 1/5 interest in the 
Pearson Spring and denying the Town's claim of statutory forfeiture. 
To the contrary, Cornish adduced sufficient evidence of non-use of the 
disputed 1/5 interest by Pearsons and their successors, at least prior 
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to 1962, to meet its evidentiary threshhold of a prima facie case and 
shift the burden of proof to the Rollers to rebut the same. 
Except for occasional water from the lower Butler Hollow Springs, 
the witnesses testified that the Butler Hollow area was dry. Thus, 
except for sporadic rainfall or Butler Hollow Spring water or post-1962 
surface run-off, all of the water of the Pearson Spring was necessarily 
being collected by the Town's catch lines and collection basin at the 
Pearson Spring area and being diverted totally into the Town's water 
system. The 1/5 interest now claimed by the Rollers was never actually 
diverted or used by them or their predecessors until after 1962 and 
during the subsequent wet years. There is no evidence of any claim 
ever being made by Rollers or their predecessors prior to this lawsuit 
in 1979 of an entitlement to divert 1/5 of the water from the Pearson 
Spring catch basin or the Town's line; nor was there any evidence of 
any attempt to ever physically effect such a diversion. As Asael 
Buttars testified, the Town took all of the water from the Pearson 
Spring. For Rollers to claim that any run-off which came out of the 
Pearson Spring area and down in to the Hollow (i.e., that water which 
was either surface rain water 0£ spring water percolating to the 
surface in wet years and not efficiently collected by the Town after 
1962, which recent flow is sporadic and fluctuates widely in volume), 
somehow constitutes the disputed 1/5 interest, not only seems terribly 
imprecise but also a bit strained. If, in fact, Marie Dobbs or her 
successors at any time claimed a 1/5 interest in the spring, one would 
expect them to have made demand for the same or to establish some sort 
of weir system to physically divert exactly 1/5 of the flow of the 
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Pearson Spring, either out of the catch basin or otherwise,. But what 
flow has come down into the Hollow from the Pearson Spring area, both 
before and since 1962, has come by mere happenstance, not deliberate or 
measured diversion. 
The Defendants, at- page 16 of their Reply Brief, "acknowledge that 
the law is as cited by Cornish with regards to forfeiture*11 Presumably 
this includes the law cited in Cornish1s Cross-Appellantfs Brief to the 
effect that there is a presumption of forfeiture under Utah Law once 
five years of non-beneficial use is shown; that the forfeiture is 
mandatory and automatic; and that the statute is to be strictly 
construed. The question, then, is one of fact, and Cornish is content 
to rely upon the transcript testimony referenced above to show that it 
produced more than enough evidence to prove that, at least from 1939 to 
1962, neither Marie Dobbs nor the Rollers used any Pearson Spring water 
coming down the hollow (as distinguished from mere rainfall and the 
3/4-inch tap) for any beneficial use. Having met its^threshold burden 
of proof, the burden to rebut passed as a matter of law to Rollers, and 
their testimony on this precise point is nonexistent. 
The Defendants raise two new legal issues at page 9 of their Reply 
Brief which merit some comment. First, it should be noted that there 
is no language in Rocky Ford Irrigation Co., et al. v. Rents Lake 
Reservoir Company, et al., 104 Utah 216,140 P.2d 63 (1943), with 
respect to non-forfeiture where failure to use water beneficially is a 
result of natural causes beyond the control of the appropriator. Even 
if there were, this case is different, for the water was available - it 
was merely appropriated fully by the Town of Cornish at the point of 
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its Pearson Spring catch basin. There was no evidence in this case of 
floods or drought. It was not beyond the control of the Marie Dobbs or 
the Rollers to demand, by legal action or otherwise, that 1/5 of the 
water being piped by the Town be diverted down the hollow to the old 
Lars Pearson house. This was never done. 
The statement quoted by Rollers from Deseret Livestock Company v. 
Hooppiania, 66 Utah 25, 235 P. 479 (Utah, 1925), likewise, is not on 
point with the subject appeal. The absence of a "natural channel11 in 
the instant case is explained simply by (1) the fact that virtually all 
of the flow of the Pearson Spring has been appropriated by the Town of 
Cornish via its municipal waterworks system coming out of the Pearson 
Spring since 1939 (i.e., there was a natural channel before the Town's 
1939 construction diverted it) and (2) the fact that whatever sporadic 
water that comes down Butler Hollow, be it rainfall or otherwise, is 
dammed up by the man-made fishpond built by Rollers in or shortly after 
1962 (which, incidentally created a new, unapproved use -- See Rocky 
Ford, at 639) . These circumstances are a far cry from the totally 
natural circumstances considered by the Court in Deseret Livestock. 
Moreoever, the issue before the Court on this appeal is a forfeiture, 
not appropriation, as in Deseret Livestock. 
The statute of limitations issue argued in Defendants1 Reply Brief 
at pages 10-11 was alleged for the first time in Rollers1 Trial Brief, 
more than a month after the trial. It was never pled, nor did the 
Court ever treat it. Cornish objected to its belated introduction in 
the Town's subsequent Memorandum of Points and Authorities on the same 
basis as it does now. It is wholly inappropriate to assert any statute 
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of limitations defense now, inasmuch as no statute of limitation was 
asserted as an affirmative defense in any pleading filed by the 
Defendants herein until after trial and, hence, Cornish had no 
opportunity at trial to respond to any such defense. In addition, it 
would appear that the statutes of limitation asserted by Kollers are 
either inapposite to matters presently before the Court or have never 
been held by any court to be applicable to such matters. With respect 
to Section 78-12-29 (the one-year statute of limitation for an action 
upon a statute for a penalty or a forfeiture), no Utah case relates the 
same to statutory forfeiture of water rights. Moreover, the statute on 
its face is inapplicable to this case, inasmuch as it applies only to 
civil forfeiture rights given to an "individual," whereas the 
forfeiture here asserted is made by a municipal corporation, which 
asserts that the water is forfeited, not to itself, but to the public 
domain. In any event, regardless of any statute of limitations which 
may have some application to the present case, it is clear from the 
language of Section 74-1-3 and the caselaw cited in the Town's 
Cross-Appellant's Brief that the forfeiture is automatic, as a matter 
of law, upon the passage of five years of non-use. 
Accordingly, the Court should declare that the original pre-1903 
diligence right deeded to Marie Pearson Dobbs in 1937 was subsequently 
forfeited by her and/or her successors' non-use of the same for a 
period of five years or more and that such water has become part of the 
public domain until properly appropriated by one following the 
procedures specified by State law. 
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POINT II. The absence of any beneficial use of Pearson Spring water 
(except the 3/4-inch tap right) on the Pearson property by Mrs. Dobbs 
and her family prior to 1960 means, as a matter of law, that any 
alleged one-fifth (1/5) interest in the Pearson Spring was no longer 
appurtenant to said property, thereby precluding any transfer of the 
alleged one-fifth (1/5) interest by Mrs. Dobbs' 1960 Deed to the 
Defendants. 
Cornish claims that the Trial Court erred in its Finding No. 14 on 
the basis that there is no evidence in the record to substantiate the 
finding that "Pearson Spring water flowing down Butler Hollow has been 
beneficially used by the Pearsons and their successors the Rollers,11 if 
the critical distinctions emphasized in the Town's Statement of Facts 
herein are properly applied. The Rollers1 Reply Brief acknowledges 
that they agree with the law asserted by Cornish's Brief in the matter 
of non-appurtenance by virtue of no beneficial use, but claim that the 
facts are other than the Town asserts. For Rollers' factual basis, 
they cite the testimony of Asael Buttars (A. B. Tr. , page 71). This 
excerpt from Asael Buttars testimony, however, only serves to reaffirm 
the importance of the key distinctions raised by Cornish. Namely, the 
language excerpted from Asael Buttars' testimony refers to water out of 
Butler Hollow from the Butler Hollow Springs or simply from rain 
run-off. Nowhere does he indicate that this water came from the 
Pearson Spring itself. To the contrary, he indicates elsewhere that 
the Town took all of the water from the Pearson Spring (A. B. Tr., 60, 
71, 73) . 
The Warranty Deed from Marie Dobbs to the Defendants, dated 
January 25, 1960 (Exhibit 9), which conveys the old Lars Pearson 
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property "together with all water rights used thereon/8 could only 
convey such water rights as were appurtenant to the Lars Pearson 
property at that time ("used thereon11). Section 73-1-11, 1953 Utah 
Code Annotated, regarding water rights appurtenant to land passing to a 
grantee has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Stephens v. 
Burton, 546 P.2d 240, (Utah, 1976), to mean that water "appurtenant to" 
a tract of land conveyed is water which is "beneficially used on the 
property prior to and at the time of the sale." The Court also held 
that this same test should be used to determine the amount of water to 
which a successor in interest is entitled. 
Cross-Appellant is not aware of any testimony at trial that any 
Pearson Spring overflow ever ran down Butler Hollow and was ever 
applied to any specific beneficial use at the old Lars Pearson 
homestead at the time of or immediately before the 1960 conveyance from 
Marie Pearson Dobbs to Rollers. The only relevant testimony would be 
Evan Kollers1 testimony that the hollow was generally dry and that 
sporadic run-off out of Butler Hollow was collected in their new fish 
pond/dam after 1962. Moreover, any excess flow from the Pearson Spring 
which may have run down Butler Hollow after 1962 (or at any time) has 
been merely fortuitous -- a far cry from actual diversion of a specific 
amount of water (i.e., 1/5 of the Pearson Spring flow) for a specific 
beneficial use. And before the dam was built by Kollers, he testified 
that all the water coming out of the hollow was lost anyway in the 
gravelly area (E. K. Tr. 42). Asael Buttars and Verl Buxton testified 
that the only Pearson Spring water used on Dobbs1 property from 1938 to 
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1970 was water flowing through the old 3/4-inch tap line in the field 
south of the hollow, and nothing else. 
Rollers1 reference to the aerial photos (Exhibit 60) introduced in 
this case "showing the approximate area of foliage irrigated from 
Butler Hollow water sources and the culinary tap right" is insufficient 
to prove any right to water from the Pearson Springe Such natural 
vegetation may occur from mere rainfall and cannot by itself prove the 
flow of the waters or their source (i.e., Pearson Spring as opposed to 
Butler Hollow Spring or rainfall) . Plaintiff was under the impression 
that Utah does not recognize riparian-type water rights. In any event, 
Evan Roller's testimony was that the Pearson Spring area and Butler 
Hollow were dry prior to 1962. He also testified that the foliage 
around the house was watered by the 3/4-inch tap right (E. R. Tr. , 
40-2, 47-8, 143). 
The Rollers seek to distinguish two cases cited in Cornish's 
Cross-Appellant's Brief, Lehi Irrigation v. Moyle, 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 
(1886) and City of Springville v. Fullmer, 7 Utah 450, 27 P. 577 (1891) 
on the basis that they were early water law cases decided when the law 
of Utah recognized the doctrine of adverse possession. Cornish would 
simply draw the Court's attention to the fact that the holdings in 
these cases do not rely on any doctrine of adverse possession. Their 
holdings are based solely upon equitable principles of acquiescence and 
estoppel. 
Rollers' primary defense against the Town's claim of 
"non-appurtenance via no beneficial use at time of conveyance" is their 
reference to Entry No. W.U.C. 25-6719 in the 1979 Bear River 
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Determination of Water Rights (the "Kimball Decree18), and Cornish's 
Entry No. W.U.C. 25-3079 therein. The Rollers represent to this Court 
that W.U.C. 25-6719 represents their 1/5 interest in the Pearson Spring 
and W.U.C. 25-3079 represents Cornish's 4/5 interest in that spring, 
stating at page 13 of their Reply Briefs "At the time of the entry of 
the Kimball Decree Cornish did not object to the entry representing the 
Koller 1/5 interest, nor did Koller object to the entry representing 
Cornish's 4/5 interest in the Pearson Spring." Without dwelling on the 
fact that there was ti£ evidence introduced at trial as to whether 
either side objected to these entries at the appropriate time, Cornish 
would draw the Court's attention to the more critical absence of any 
transcript reference by Rollers for their claim that these Kimball 
Decree entries represent their respective 1/5 and 4/5 interests in the 
Pearson Spring. That is because the argument was never made by 
Defendants at trial that W.U.C. 25-6719 represented their 1/5 interest 
in the Pearson Spring. If the Court will study Exhibit 15 (Addendum), 
it will observe that there are no references anywhere to 1/5 or 4/5 of 
the spring. Instead, Entry 6719 accords Evan Koller a 0.015 c.f.s. 
appropriation from the Pearson Spring and Entry 3079 accords Cornish 
Town a 0.56 c.f.s. appropriation from the Pearson Spring. A little 
arithmetic makes it quite clear, that although the numbers are 
coincidentally close to being in a 1:4 ratio, they are not in such a 
ratio. If the State Engineer and/or the District Court were trying 
with the Kimball Decree to accord a 1/5 interest to Evan Koller and 4/5 
interest to the Town, surely the numbers would match up precisely; but 
they do not. This belated reference to these two appropriations under 
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the Kimball Decrees is nothing more than a belated bootstrapping 
argument. Dee Hansen testified that the 0*015 appropriation under 
Entry No. W.U.C. 25-6719 related to the 3/4-inch tap right reserved to 
Rollers and their predecessors under the 1938 Deed (D. He Tr., 39-40). 
Moreover, W.U.C. Entry 25-3079 clearly relates to the Town's 1939 
appropriation under Exhibit 13 (a year-round right to ,056 c.f.s.), not 
the 4/5 interest for the irrigation season which Cornish received under 
the 1938 Deed (D. H. Tr., 23). 
Lastly, Cornish takes issue with Rollers' bald assertion at page 
13 of their Reply Brief that "the portions of the Pearson Spring not 
trapped by the catch basin are water rights of Evan Roller and his 
predecessors," for which they offer neither evidence nor law. To the 
contrary, the Town is entitled to all the water which it can collect 
from the Pearson Spring area, particularly in light of the fact that 
the Town anticipates redeveloping the Pearson Spring so that its 
collection system will be more efficient and the water a better quality 
(E. R. Tr., 60). 
As a matter of law, there were no water rights appurtenant to the 
land sold to the Defendants in 1960 by Marie Pearson Dobbs, except for 
the 3/4-inch tap to the old Lars Pearson home south of the hollow, 
because no other water from the Pearson Spring had been put to 
beneficial use on the Pearson property at the time of or immediately 
prior to the 1960 conveyance. 
POINT III. The Defendants are equitably estopped from claiming any 
alleged one-fifth (1/5) interest from Marie Pearson Dobbs by virtue of 
their and their predecessors1 acquiescence for more than 40 years to 
Cornish Town's use of all of the Pearson Spring water and the Town's 
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construction and ongoing maintenance, repair and development of its 
municipal waterworks for that period of time. 
Plaintiff contends that the Trial Court erred in accepting 
Findings of Fact Nos. 13 and 14 (prepared by Defendants) because the 
testimony at trial gives no support therefor, but, rather, supports 
Plaintiff's claim of estoppel by acquiescence. 
Cornish Town never received any notice from Defendants or their 
predecessors as to any rights to an alleged one-fifth (1/5) interest in 
the Pearson Spring until this lawsuit in late 1979. The Town had 
constructed its waterworks from the Pearson Spring, diverted the entire 
flow of the Pearson Spring (until recent years, when its collection 
system, in need of significant repair, was not as efficient in 
collecting all the water), had maintained and repaired the same, and 
had installed a second reservoir, chlorinator station and pump house 
(A. B. Tr. page 52; V. B. Tr. 11). All these actions were taken by 
by Cornish on the belief, never contradicted by Rollers or their 
predecessors until 1979, that the Town was entitled to take the entire 
flow of the Pearson Spring (i.e., whatever they could collect from the 
Pearson Spring area), subject to the 3/4-inch tap reservation. 
The principle that one who, with the knowledge and consent of the 
original owner of certain water rights expends time and money in 
developing certain water rights, believing he is entitled to use the 
same, thereby acquires a right to such water, and that who one stands 
by and watches another party spend time and money in the construction 
and maintenance of a water source and in making improvements to the 
same, will be estopped from later denying such a right, was first 
enunciated in Utah in Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Moyle, 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 
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867 (1886) . In the subsequent case of City of Springville v. Fullmer, 
7 Utah 450, 27 P. 577 (1891), the Court reached a similar conclusion 
and even went so far as to say that it was "not only the right, but the 
duty, of the city to employ such remedies as the law or the rules of 
equity authorized to defend and maintain such right to control the use 
of such waters by the people." At 578. 
Given the consistent acquiescence over 40 years by Marie Pearson 
Dobbs and her successors to the Town's use of all the Pearson Spring 
water (except the 3/4-inch tap right), never contesting the Town's 
right to collect all the water it could from the Pearson Spring area 
from 1939 until 1979, and given the Town's reliance on that 
acquiescence in its expenditure of time and money to construct the 
Pearson Spring waterworks and improve and maintain the same over the 
years, this Court should estop the Rollers from belatedly depriving 
Cornish of the one-fifth (1/5) interest which the Town has appropriated 
and used all these years. 
SECOND ISSUE: 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO FURTHER CLARIFY THE 
RESPECTIVE SEASONAL WATER RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES PURSUANT 
TO THE UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY OF THE STATE ENGINEER? 
POINT I. The State Engineer, Dee Hansen, testified that the Pearson 
Spring waters should be formally divided between Cornish and the 
Rollers not only as to their respective shares of the original flow, 
but also as to irrigation and non-irrigation season rights, and as to 
the secondary right appropriated by the Town in 1939. The Court could 
and should have adopted his testimony and clarified the parties' 
respective rights in the Pearson Spring. There was no justification 
for not making such clarification as requested at that time and 
subsequently by the Town in the absence of any contradictory evidence. 
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The issue of the parties1 respective seasonal rights to Pearson 
Spring water arises by virtue of the Trial Court's rejection of 
Plaintiff's Proposed Findings 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, and the additional 
finding proposed in a subsequent motion (all recited at pp. 26 and 27 
of Cross-Appellant's Brief). Plaintiff urged the Court to adopt these 
findings in order to clarify not only the parties' respective seasonal 
entitlements in and to the Pearson Spring water, but also their 
respective priority dates. The testimony of the State Engineer, Dee 
Hansen, was particularly helpful inasmuch as it was intended to clarify 
any prior misconceptions regarding previous decisions of the State 
Engineer and the so-called Kimball Decree (D. H. Tr., all, and 
Cross-Appellant's Brief, pp. 6, 9, 11, 32-39). These excerpts from the 
testimony of Dee Hansen, particularly his clarifications under re-cross 
examination by Rollers' counsel, more than suffice to ratify the 
findings proposed by Plaintiff. Cross-Appellant is content to rely on 
the Court's careful reading of the entire transcript of Dee Hansen's 
testimony on the issue of parties' respective seasonal rights to the 
Pearson Spring water in order to determine the correct findings and 
related conclusions on this issue. 
Defendants' specific objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Findings 
13, 14, 15 and 17 are set forth at pages 15-16 of their Reply Brief. 
Defendants state that Finding 13 "fails to include a winter 
stock-watering right". This objection has no relevancy to proposed 
Finding 13 whatsoever, inasmuch as Finding 13 relates only to Cornish's 
4/5 interest in the Pearson Spring, which interest is only for culinary 
and domestic purposes, not stockwatering. 
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Defendants' objection to Proposed Finding 14 is appropriate, 
however, and Plaintiff acknowledges that language of reservation is 
inappropriate in that context and the Finding should be amended to 
indicate instead that Mrs. Dobbs failed to convey her interest. 
Defendants1 objection to proposed Finding 16 is that it "omits the 
stockwatering and culinary right found in Evan Roller's filing W.U.C. 
25-6719." Plaintiff finds this objection rather curious, inasmuch as 
proposed Finding 16 deals with the 3/4-inch tap right. Defendants' 
reference to W.U.C. 25-6719 in connection with a 3/4-inch tap right 
confirms Plaintiff's interpretation of that Kimball Decree entry and 
would seem to contradict the interpretation thereof which Rollers 
attempt to give at page 13 of their Reply Brief (i.e., that W.U.C. 
25-6719 refers to their 1/5 interest, not the 3/4-inch tap 
reservation). 
Defendants' objection to Plaintiff's proposed Finding 17 is that 
it "ignores stockwatering and culinary rights". Again, this objection 
would seem to be irrelevant, inasmuch as proposed Finding 17 relates 
solely to Cornish Town's claim to 4/5 of the first .056 c.f.s. of 
water flowing from the Pearson Spring during the non-irrigation season, 
which is strictly for the Town's culinary water and has nothing to do 
with stockwatering. 
Lastly, Plaintiff notes that Defendants have articulated no 
objection to the additional proposed Finding, which Plaintiff proposed 
to the Court in its hearing after trial, which additional Finding is 
stated at page 27 of Plaintiff's Cross-Appellant's Brief to the effect 
that Plaintiff, by virtue of its 1938 year-round appropriation of .056 
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c.f.s. of water flowing from the Pearson Spring under (Exhibit fs13lf) , 
also has, in addition to its deeded diligence rights from the Lars 
Pearson family, an additional .056 c.f.s. of flow from the Pearson 
Spring during the summer-irrigation season, if and when such additional 
flow is available (See D. H. Tr. 9, 14-15). 
The only water rights which Lars Pearson and his family (including 
Marie Dobbs) had to convey were those which they had beneficially 
used--the full flow of the Pearson Spring during the summer/irrigation 
season (and the year-round use of the 3/4-inch tap reservation 
contained in the 1938 deed to Cornish). The Town of Cornish acquired 
4/5 of the Pearsons1 pre-1903 diligence right in the spring during the 
irrigation season by deed. Shortly thereafter, it acquired a 
year-round appropriation of .056 c.f.s, by virtue of its 1939 
Certificate of Appropriation (Exhibit 13) , which gave the Town a 1937 
priority appropriation to all of the winter/non-irrigation season water 
(except the 3/4-inch tap reservation to the Lars Pearson homestead), 
plus an additional appropriation of .056 c.f.s. on the summer/ 
irrigation season flow from the Pearson Spring (if and when available). 
These conclusions should be formalized by adoption of the six findings 
proposed by Plaintiff and rejected by the Trial Court. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Cornish Town contends that a clear reading of the trial 
transcripts and exhibits regarding Rollers1 alleged one-fifth (1/5) 
interest in the Pearson Spring, when measured against the applicable 
law of forfeiture, appurtenance and estoppel by acquiescence, mandates 
either the forfeiture of the disputed one-fifth (1/5) interest in the 
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Pearson Spring to the public domain or the equitable transfer of the 
same to Cornish Town. 
The four distinctions raised by Cornish in its Statement of Facts 
at the beginning of this Brief, and discussed through its Argumment, 
are critical to the Court's review of the evidence before it. If the 
Court distinguishes (1) Pearson Spring water from Butler Hollow Springs 
water, (2) spring water from mere rainfall or run-off water, (3) water 
coming out of Butler Hollow from water coming to the Lars Pearson house 
through the 3/4-inch tap, and (4) pre-1962 from post-1962 flow and 
usage, then Plaintiff is confident that the Court will find sufficient 
support in the evidence to reverse the Trial Court on its Findings 13, 
14 and 15 and paragraph 3 of its Order of Judgment regarding the 
disputed 1/5 interest in the Pearson Spring. This result may be 
reached by finding either (1) a statutory forfeiture by virtue of any 
five-year period of non-use by Marie Pearson Dobbs and/or Rollers since 
1939, or (2) the absence of any beneficial use of water from the 
Pearson Spring on the Pearson property (other than the 3/4-inch tap) by 
Marie Pearson Dobbs at or immediately prior to the conveyance of the 
1960 deed to the Rollers, rendering the subject water rights 
non-appurtenant to the subject property; or (3) a longer standing 
period (approximately 40 years) of acquiescence by the Rollers and 
their predecessors to the Town's use of the 1/5 interest, coupled with 
the Town's expenditure of time, money and effort to improve and 
maintain its waterworks, which should estop the Rollers from belatedly 
asserting a 1/5 interest in the Spring. 
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Cornish Town further contends that a comprehensive review of the 
testimony of the State Engineer, Dee Hansen, confirms several 
clarifications of the parties1 respective seasonal water rights, which 
the Trial Court could and should have adopted in its findings so as to 
avoid future problems or disputes. This Court should reverse the Trial 
Court for its rejection of Plaintiff's six Proposed Findings and direct 
that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree 
be conformed to the evidence, as they may need to be amended by this 
Court's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 28th day of May, 1985. 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
By ,ff0^(^^ ' 
WilliamX* F i l lmore Attorneys for Cornish Town 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered four (4) true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing Cross Appellantfs Reply Brief to the 
Defendant/Cross-Respondents' Attorney, George We Preston, of Harris, 
Preston, Gutke & Chambers, at 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah, 84321, on 
this 28th day of May, 1985; and fifteen (15) copies of the above and 
foregoing Cross Appellant's Reply Brief have been hand-delivered to the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, on this 28th day of 
May, 1985. 
VIII. ADDENDUM 
O R I G I N A L 
CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATION OF WATER 
STATE OF UTAH 
APPUCATION TVO. 12650 CERTIFICATE NO 2331 
NAME AND ADDRESS O F APPROPRIATOR TOWN OF CORNISH. C0PJ?ISH. UTAH 
SOURCE OF SUPPLY ESARSOU SER1HS IN CACHE COUNTY, UTAH; BEAR RTVER DRAINAGE ARE 
QUANTITY OF WATER FTFTY-STX THOUSANDTHS (O.O56) SEC0ND-I00T PRIORITY OF RIGHT LLRCliJ), 1938 
PERIOD AND NATURE O F USE JAMTARY 1 TO imiamTO ?1
 fl TNCT.TTSTVF - FOR DOLESTTC AW UIUTCTPHT. PIFHPQSES 
JSl\trtns9 It has been made to appear to the satisfaction of the undersigned that the appropriation of water has been perfected in accordance with the Law 
of Utah; SJIferefnrc, Be it known that I. _ T* H* HbUEHERTS - the duly appointed, qualified and acting State Engineer, by authority 0 
the Laws of Utah, do hereby certify that said approprxator is entitled to the use of water as herein set out, subject to prwt rights, if any, for diversion and t«s 
as follows, to-wit:— 
The w a t e r i s c o l l e c t e d by means of 780 f t . o f 4 " t i l e p i p e , which d i s c h a r g e s i n t o a c o n c r e t e i n t a k e box l o c a t e d a t t h e p o i n t of issuaj 
of t h e s p r i n g , thence d i v e r t e d and conveyed th rough 3750 f t , of 6" p i p e and 2000 f t . of 4" p ipe t o a r e i n f o r c e d c o n c r e t e d i s t r i b u t i o n r e se j 
v o i r , from which i t i s r e l e a s e d a s needed and conveyed by p ipe a f u r t h e r a i s t a n c e of 4700 f t . t o t h e Tov/n of C o r n i s h , *he re i t i s d i s t r i b u t 
th rough l a t e r a l p i p e s and used by t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of t h e Town from J a n u a r y 1 t o December 3 1 , i n c l u s i v e of each and every y e a r , a s a supnler 
t a l supply f o r domes t ic and m u n i c i p a l p u r n o s e s . 
The p o i n t of d i v e r s i o n from t h e s p r i n g , a l r e a d y r e f e r r e d t o , i s l o c a t e d ; . . 4720 f t , and S. 364O f t . from t h e NE Cor . S e c . 8 , T. 14 N. , 
R. 1 W., SLB3&I. The d i s t r i b u t i o n r e s e r v o i r has i n s i d e dimensions of 20v x 20* x 1 0 . 5 ' and i s l o c a t e d W. 2120 f t . and N. 19 f t . from t h e E£ 
Cor . S e c . 1 7 , T. 14 N . , R. 1 V7., SLBfidi. The p l a c e of u s e w i t h i n t h e Town of Corn i sh embraces p a r t s of the S5 S e c . 33 and ti^SWi S e c . 3 4 , 
T. 15 N . , R. 1 17.
 f SLBkM., and NV/£ and V/jSWJ: S e c . 3 , E5 , N^NWi, and S^SU^ Sec* 4 , NE&Ni7£ and E*F Sec* 9, .'4 *** N^i S e c « 1°» w 5 S e c - * 5 , NEi 
E^SEi, and SW^SE^ S e c . 1 6 , NZ£ S e c . 2 1 , and NP/i S e c . 229 T. 14 N . , R. 1 17., SLZB&L!. 
<3tt $Bitne*B JSIjcrcof, / have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of my office t}his„ _ Zl day of _ KCVEMBEH __ f 1 9 3 2 _ 
T. H. HUUPKETQTS, ^STATE ENGINEER 
\ 1 
/18 
6717 
3079 
NAME JNTEREST 
MAP NUMBER
 ? Y F E o F m G H T 
PRIORITY 
Evan Koller 
Map 15b 
NCF Diligence 
1903 P / -
Map 15b 
A 12650 
C 2337 
3/9/1938 
SOURCE 
FLOW 
POINT OF DIVERSION 
West Spring 
0.008 cfs* 
N. 30 ft. W. U35 ft. 
from SE Coi. Sec. 6, 
T14N, R1W, SLBM. 
Pearson Spring 
0.056 cfs 
S. 3640 ft. W. 4720 ft. 
from HE Cor. Sec. 8, 
T14N, R1W, SLBM. 
PURPOSE AND PLACE OF USE 
IRRIGATION: 0*1 acs. SE'iSEk, 
Sec. 6, T14N, R1WB SLBM, 0.4 acs. 
NEkNE't Sec. 7, T14N9 RlW, SLBM, 
or a total of 0.5 acs. 
See Claims Used For Purpose 
Described 
STOCKWATERING: 5,000 sheep, 500 
cattle & horses 
See Claims Used For Purpose 
Described 
MISCELLANEOUS: Washing & 
servicing equipment 
See Claims Used For Purpose 
Described 
MUNICIPAL: Cornish Town 
See Claims Used For Purpose 
Described 
PERIOD OF USE 
C USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED 
ANNUAL WATER ALLOWED 
April 1 - Oct. 31 
6717 
2.0 ac. ft. 
Jan. 1 - Dec. 31 
6716, 6717, 6718 
Jan. 1 - Dec. 3l 
6717 
Jan. 1 - Dec. 31 
3045, 3072, 3079, 3389 
REMARKS 
*Flow for stockwatering is part 
of flow for irrigation. 
**Dlverslon any, each, or all 
claims. Total yearly diversion 
under all claims mentioned 42.0 
ac. ft. 
*Flow for miscellaneous is part 
of flow for irrigation. 
221 
W.U.C 
NUMBER 
3145 
3350 
NAME 
MAP NUMBER 
PRIORITY 
INTEREST 
TYPE OF RIGHT 
Norris K. Anderson 
Map 35d 
A 17010, NPR 
10/22/1945 
SOURCE 
FLOW 
POINT OF DIVERSION 
\<*L 19 
Nonnan 0 . N i e l s e n 
Map 16c 
A 31316 Election 
8/15/1959 
PURPOSE AND PLACE OF USE 
Underground water, Well STOCKWATERING: 50 cattle 
PERIOD OF USE 
C USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED 
ANNUAL WATER ALLOWED 
,1" 
0.002 cfs 
S. 41 ft. W 
from NE Cor. Sec. 
T13N, R1W, SLBM. 
456 ft. 
28, 
Evan Koller 
Map- 15b 
Diligence 
1902 
Waste drain ditch from 
Creger lateral of Cub 
River Irrigation Co. 
and outlet 02 of drain-
age District #3 
1.16 cfs 
S. 10 ft. W. 580 ft. 
from Ek Cor. Sec. 14, 
TUN, R1W, SLBM. 
See Claims Used For Purpose 
Described 
IRRIGATION: 20.5 acs. NE*cSE*t 9.3 (April 1 - Oct. 3:> 
acs. WfcSEk Sec. 14, TUN, R1W, 
SLBM, or a total of 29.8 acs. 
Jan. 1 - Dec. 31 
3145 
1.40 ac. ft. 
Pearson Spring 
0.015 cfs* 
S. 3640 ft. W. 4720 ft. 
from NE Cor. Sec. 8, 
T14N, R1W, SLBM. 
See Claims Used For Purpose 
Described 
3350 & rights diverted 
in Idaho 
fa*** 
W ?U4 
IRRIGATION: 2 .0 a c s . SE*tSE*t Sec . 
8 , TUN, R1W, SLBM. 
See Claims Used For Purpose 
Descr ibed 
! *By ntivirandu^i J. . IM'OH by the 
! S t a t e E n ^ i o e f r ' s O f f i c e , t h i s 
a p p l i c a t i o n i s l i m i t e d in i t s 
p e r i o d rf **z* t ^ • ' e oe r iod when 
C u t l e r Dan I , -» J 2 * . ?. 
**Diver^ i r r . aw , -<^n , or a l l 
c l a i m s . To ta l e a r l y d i v e r s i o n 
under a l l claim.- ui^iit.oned 119.2 
a c . f t . 
STOCKWATERING: 15 cattle & horses 
See Claims Used For Purpose 
Described 
April 1 - Oct. 31 
6716, 6719 
** 
DOMESTIC One family 
See Claims Used For Purpose 
Described 
Jan . 1 - Dec. 31 
6719 
0 .42 a c . f t . 
**Divers lor . any, e«*ch, or a l l 
claitPi*. Tot 31 v e n ^ v d i v e r s i o n 
under i l l « 1- 1» s r.t 'U :>ned 8 a c . 
f t . . 
*Flow f o r srocl.wut <-ri-.& i s p«irt 
of flow for i r r i g a t i o n . 
Jan. 1 - Dec. 31 
6719 
*Flov for domestic is part of 
flow for irrigation. 
